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1000 PEOPLE v. RIVERS [66 C.2d 
[Crim. No.10lli. In BaDk. July 7, 1967.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOHN RIVERS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-
Admissions and Confessions. - The Escobedo-Dorado rules, 
concerning the inadmissibility of statements obtained from an 
accused without first advising him of his rights to counsel and 
to remain silent, do not apply to reinstated appeals in cases 
in which the judgment became final prior to June 22, 1964, 
and in which appellant was denied counsel on appeal.(Disap-
proving, insofar ns they arc inconsistent, People v. Jaquisl., 
244 Cal.App.2d 444, 448 [53 Cal.Rptr. 123] ; People v. Boyden, 
237 Cal.App.2d 695, 697 [47 Cal.Rptr. 136]; People v. Garner, 
234 C~1.App.2d 212, 215, fn. 1 [44 Cal.Rptr. 217]; People v. 
Benavidez,233 Cal.App.2d 303 [43 Cal.Rptr. 577].) 
(2] Id.-Evidence-Confessions-Voluntary Character-Review.-
When an accused's confession has been admitted in evidence 
against him, even if the Escobed(l rule, concerning advice to 
the accused of his rights to counsel and to remain silent 
before obtaining the confession, does not apply to his case, as 
a r~instated appeal, the rulcs of Escobedo and Miranda, con-
cernirig advice of the right to the presence of counsel during 
interrogation and thc presence of an assigned attorney if 
defendant is indigent, must be taken into account on the issue 
of whether the confession was voluntary. 
[8] Id.-Evidence-Confessions--Voluntary Character-Review: 
Appeal-Presumptions-Evidence.-Although the Supreme 
Court cannot presume from a silent record that proper warn-
ings were given to an accused of his rights to remain silent 
and to have the aid and presence of counsel during interroga-
tion, a failure to warn, standing alone, does not suftice to 
support a claim that defendant's statements were involuntary 
where both defendant and the interrogating officer testified to __ 
the voluntariness of the statements. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Diego County. Clarence Harden, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for robbery. Judgment of conviction of first 
degree robbery affirmed. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 616. 
MeR. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 1381.1(2); [2] 
Criminal Law, § 480(1); [3] Criminal Law, §§ 480(1), 1292. 
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Allan L. Rudick, under appointment by the Supreme Court, 
for Defendant and Appellant. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James, 
Assistant Attorney General, and C. Anthony Collins, Deputy 
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.--John Rivers and two codefendants, 
Benny Carter and Walter Robinson, were convicted in 1960 of 
first degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211).1 Rivers alone 
appealed. He abandoned the appeal after his application for 
appointment of counsel on appeal was denied. The appeal was 
dismissed in 1961. Pursuant to Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 
853 [9 L.Ed.2d 811, 83 S.Ct. 814], this court in 1965 directed 
the Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division One, to recall 
the remittitur, vacate the order of dismissal, reinstate the 
appeal, and appoint counsel for Rivers. The Court of Appeal 
affirmed the judgment of conviction. We ordered a hearing in 
this court on our own motion to give further consideration to 
the possible application of Escobedo v. IUinois (1964) 378 
U.S. 478 [12 L.Ed.2d 977, 84 8.Ct. 1758], and People v. Do-
rado (1965) 62 Ca1.2d 338 [42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361]. 
On March 21, 1960, a San Diego food market was robbed. 
An employee identified Rivers' car as the one he saw slowly 
pass the market several times shortly before the robbery. 
There were three men in the car. Three eyewitnesses identified 
the two codefendants as the robbers who entered the store. A 
police officer testified to a conversation he had with Rivers in 
which Rivers made statements as follows: He denied his guilt 
,but admitted that he drove his car, accompanied by the code-
fendants, to the market at the time of the robbery. The 
codefendants discussed past ~nd future robberies on the way 
to the market. He waited in the car while the codefendants 
went into the market and returned. He saw both money and 
guns in the codefendants' possession after the robbery. He 
.admitted that he left hurriedly for Los Angeles at 2 :30 a.m. 
when he heard that the police wished to question him about a 
robbery. 
Rivers' only contention on this appeal is that in the light 
of Escobedo v. IllinO'is, supra, 378 U.S. 478, and People v. 
Dorado, supra, 62 Cal.2d 338, the court erroneously admitted 
lRobinson pleaded guilty to the offense. Rivers and Carter were jointly 
, tried and found euiltT by a jury. 
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the evidence of his statements to the police officer at his trial 
in 1960. 
In In re Lopez (1965) 62 Ca1.2d 368 [42 Cal.Rptr. 188, 398 
P.2d 380], we analyzed the interests involved in limiting the 
retroactivity of the Escobedo-Dorado rules in much the same 
way the United States Supreme Court did in its later resolu-
tion of similar problems.2 Although we recognized that the 
exclusionary rule of Escobedo" sought to eliminate conditions 
which invited coerced confessions" (62 Ca1.2d at p. 372) we 
concluded that the pre-existing rules were not so deficient as 
to justify reopening final judgments. Drawing an analogy to 
earlier state and lower federal court decisions on the retro-
activity of the Fourth' Amendment exclusionary rule, we 
concluded. that judgments that were final as of the date of 
Escobedo (June 22, 1964) could not be attacked on the basis 
of that, case. (See also In re Harris, 56 Cal.2d 879, 880 [16 
, Cal.Rptr. 889, 366 P.2d 305], concurring opinion.) There-
after, the United States Supreme Court also adopted the final-
judgment-date rule to limit the retroactive effect of Jlapp v. 
Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643 [6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 84 
A.L.R.2d 933] (Linkletter v. Walker, supra, 381 U.S. 618), 
and of Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 [14 L.Ed.2d 
106,' 85 S.Ct. 1797]. (Tehan v. Shott, supra, 382 U.S. 
406.) 
Well over a year after our decision in Lopez, however, the 
United. States Supreme Court held that Escobedo applied only 
to those cases in which the trial commenced after the Esco-
bedo decision. That court not only held that the' final-
judgment-date rule was not constitutionally compelled, but 
intimated that the decision to invoke that rule in Linkletter 
and Tehan, instead of a trial-date rule, was dictated by prior 
actions the court had taken without full consideration and 
discussion of the retroactivity issue. (Johnson v. New Jersey, 
supra, 384 U.S. 719, 732.) It further stated, however, that 
"States are still entirely free ... to apply those standards 
in a broader range of cases than is required by this deci-
sion." (Id. at p. 733.) 
Lopez had given broader application to Escobedo than was 
constitutionally compelled in the interim between Lopez and 
2Compare the analysis 01. 1ft, re Lop~, 62 Cal.2d 368, 372·381 [42 Cal. 
Rptr. 188, 398 P.2d 380], with that in Lifl.kletter v. Walker (1965) 381 
U.S. 618, 636-640 [14 L.Ed.2d 601, 85 S.Ct. 1731]; Tehatn v. Shott (1&65) 
382 U.S. 406, 413·419 [15 L.Ed.2d 453, 86 s.et. 459]; JohnaOfl, v. New 
Jersey ~1966) 384 U.S. 719, 726-732 [16 L.Ed.2d 882, 86 B.Ot. 1772]. 
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Johnson. In People v. Rollins (1967) 65 Ca1.2d 681 [56 
Cal.Rptr. 293, 423 P.2d 221], we reconsidered the effective 
date for the application of Escobedo in light of the Johnson 
decision and faced for the first time the issue of the effective 
date for the application of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 
U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974]. 
We chose to follow Johnson in applying Miranda only to 
those cases in which the trial began after J nne 13, 1966. (65 
Cal.2d at p. 687. ) We adhered to the rule of Lopez, however, 
for the application of Escobedo. 
There are persuasive reasons for preferring a final-
judgment-date rule to a trial date rule. S Although these 
reasons were overcome by considerations relative to the appli-
cation of Miranda, the application of Escobedo to cases 0)) 
direct appeal presented different considerations. Of primary 
importance was the context in which we considered in 1966 
the application of Escobedo. We did not face the issue for the 
first time, and in weighing the potential effects of a departure 
from our Lopez rule, we noted that "The vast majority of 
cases in California which had not become final prior to .June 
22, 1964, have by this time been disposed of on appeal in 
accordance with the teaching of Escobedo and Domdo. Accor-
dingly, we need not invite the anomalies and the manifest 
injustice which the rejection of Lopez, at the virtual end of 
its natural life, would entail." (People v. Rollins, supra, 6G 
Cal.2d 681, 691.) "[W]e continue to follow Escobedo in the 
few remaining cases which were pending on direct review 
when that decision was announced." (ld. at p. 691, fn. 10.) 
Cases that were final before Escobedo, but which must now 
'See generally Mishkin, The 8upre'IM Oourt, 1964 Term-Foreword: 
The High Oourt, the Great W1'it, and the Due Process 0/ Time and Law 
(1965) 79 Harv.L.Rev. 56. 
We have reasserted our preference for the final-judgment-date rule in 
cases calling for limited retroactivity (People v. Charles (1967) ante, 
pp. 330, 335-337 [57 Cal.Rptr. 745, 425 P.2d 545]), but, as evinced 
by Rollins itself, we are not bound to a rigid formula when special 
problems exist. See People v. Bandhauer (1967) ante, pp. 524, 530-
131 [58 Cal.Rptr. 332, 426 P.2d 900], in which we adopted the Johnson 
technique by applying a rule relating to the order of argument only to 
cases tried after the announcement of the rule (People v. Hill (1967) 
Gnte, pp. 536, 564, fn. 7 [58 Cal.Rptr. 340, 426 P.2d 908]). 
The United States Supreme Court has reaffirmed its commitment to a 
flexible approach to problems of retroactivity to meet tlle "exigencies of 
the situation" in adopting in Stovall v. Denno (June 12, 1967) 35 U.B.L. 
Week 4610, 4611, a fourth alternative (right to counsel at lineups ap-
plicable only to confrontatiolls for identification purposes conducted after 
Bt01XJll). 
~ -) 
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be reconsidered on appeal, do not arise under the "natural 
life" of Lopez. Thcy constitute a separate category of cases 
that threaten to be of significant quantity, and they present 
considerations different from those in Lopez and are not 
governed by the rationale of Rollins. This new category of 
cases was 'spawned by the disapproval of California's pro-
cedure for determining when counsel should be appointed to 
represent indigent defendants on appeal. (Douglas v. Cali-
fornia, supra, 372 U.S. 353; see also Swenson v. Bosler (1967) 
386 U.S. 258 [18 L.Ed.2d 33, 87 S. Ct. ' 996] ; Anders v. Cali-
fornia .(1967) 386 U.S. 258 [18 L.Ed.2d 493, 87 8.Ct. 
1396].) Under Douglas, defendants whose convictions were 
final years ago, having exhausted all routes of appeal, are 
today afforded the assistance of counsel on appeal in all cases 
in which it was previously denied. We directed the recall of 
the remittitur and the reinstatement of the appeal in this case 
for the sole purpose of affording equality in representation 
between defendants denied counsel on appeal and defendants 
who had counsel. (372 U.S. at pp. 355-358.) To ~pply Esco-
bedo at a reinstated appeal and to review police conduct that 
occurred years before that decision would not promote equali-
ty. To the contrary, "the indigent defendant deprived of 
counSel anomalously would find himself possessed of more 
shafts in his quiver than would have been the case had he 
been able to afford to properly arm himself in the first 
instance." (People v. Garner (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 212, 
215, fn.l [44 Cal.Rptr. 217].) 
Insofar as the additional shaft provided by Escobedo is 
primarily prophylactic, it is directed at controlling future 
police conduct, not conduct that was long ago completed and 
that was then lawful. Retroactive application of Escobedo, 
regardless of the finality of the judgments of conviction or the 
voluntariness of the defendants' statements would create the 
very harms we sought to foreclose in Lopez. It "would result 
in the reconsideration of countless cases that were correctly 
decided under the law in force at the time of trial; in many 
such cases witnesses and evidence would no longer be availa-
ble. Many hardened and dangerous criminals would glean the 
greatest profit from [such a rule]; they serve lengthy sen-
tences imposed long ago; their cases thus offer the least likeli-
hood of successful retrial. To require a general release of 
prisoners of undoubted guilt would be to cripple the orderly 
administration of the criminal laws." (In re Lopez, supra, 62 
Cal.2d at p. 381.) 
--'-. 
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The serious disruption of the administration of the criminal 
law that would be caused by retrials and by the denial of the 
use of statements received in full compliance with the law 
compels adherence to the rationale of In re Lopez. [1] 'Ve 
therefore hold that the Escobedo-Dorado rules do not apply to 
reinstated appeals such as this one. Cases in which it has be(lll 
held or assumed that those rules apply to reinstated appeals 
are disapproved insofar as they are inconsistent with the 
views expressed herein (e.g., People v. Jaquish (1966) 244 
Cal.App.2d 444, 448 [53 Cal.Rptr. 123]; People Y. Boyden 
(1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 695, 697 [47 Cal.Rptr. 136] ; People v. 
Garner (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 212,215, fn. 1 [44 Cal.Hptr. 
217]; People v. Benavidez (1965) 233 CaI.App.2d 303 [43 
Cal.Rptr. 577]). 
[2] Defendant correctly contends that even if Escobedo 
does not apply to his case, the rules of Escobedo and lIf1'randa 
must nevertheless be taken into account on the issue of volun-
tariness. (Clewis v. Texas (1967) 386 U.s. 707, 709 [18 
L.Ed.2d 423, 426, 87 S. Ct. 1338, 1339] ; Johnson v. New 
Jersey, supra, 384 U.S. 719, 730.) [3] Both defendant and 
the interrogating officer testified to the voluntariness of the 
statements, and there is nothing in the record to support 
defendant's contention of involuntariness other than an 
absence of evidence that he was properiy warned. Although 
we cannot presume from a silent record that proper warnings 
were given (Miranda v. Arizona, sup"a, 384 U.S. 436, 475-476, 
498-499; People v. Stewart (1965) 62 Cal.2d 571, 580-581 [43 
Cal.Rptr. 201, 400 P.2d 97]), a failure to warn standing alone 
is not sufficient to support defendant's contention that the 
statements were involuntary (Davis v. North Carolina (1966) 
384 U.S. 737, 740 [16 L.Ed.2d 895, 86 8.Ct. 1761] ; Pembrook 
v. Wilson (1966) 370 F.2d 37,39). 
The judgment is affirmed. 
McComb, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., and Sullivan 
J., concurred. 
PETERS, J.-J dissent. 
When appellate courts :fix different dates for the operative 
effect of their decisions in criminal cases involving the same 
constitutional rights, confusion is bound to result. The instant 
case adds to that confusion by creating another unnecessary 
e:xception to an established rule. 
Until relatively recently it was an established doctrine that 
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decisions recognizing the existence of constitutional rights 
were retroactive in the full sense of that word. (Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 [9 L.Ed.2d 799, 83 8.Ct. 792, 93 
A.L.R.2d 733] ; II amilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 [7 L.Ed.2d 
114, 82 8.Ct. 157]; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 [9 
L.Ed.2d 81i, 83 8.Ct. 814].) Then this court and the Supreme 
Court of the United Stc'ltes discovered the device of making 
such decisions partially retroactive so as to apply only to 
cases not reduced to final judgment when the rules were 
announced. (In re Lopez, 62 Ca1.2d 368 [42 Cal.Rptr. 188, 398 
P.2d 380] ; Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 [14 L.Ed.2d 
601, 85 8.Ct. 1731] ; Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 [15 L.Ed.2d 
453, 86 8.Ct. 459].) Then, apparently impressed with this 
newly discovered power, the United States Supreme Court in 
Johns011 v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 [16 L.Ed.2d 882, 86 
8.Ct. 1772], held that the rules announced in Miranda v . .Ari •. 
zona, 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 8.Ct. 1602, 10 
A.LR .. 3d 974], should apply only to cases tried after the date 
of Miranda. We followed this decision (People v. Rollins, 65 . 
Cal.2d 681 [56 Cal.Rptr. 293, 423 P.2d 221]). Then, just a 
few weeks ago, the high court went all out and held that the 
lineup rule, based on the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights,' should apply only where the illegal lineup was held 
after June 12, 1967, the date of its decision. (Stovall v. 
Denno, 35 V.S.L. Week 4610.) 
In the instant case, the majority opinion adds a new rule to 
this already overcrowded field of confusion. It first reaffirms 
the rule announced in Lopez, that the rules of Escobedo and 
Dorado apply to all cases not yet final when those cases were 
decided, but then holds that the "finality" there referred to 
does not apply where the lack of finality is caused by recalling 
the remittitur. In other words, the majority hold that when a 
remittitur is recalled, and the judgment set aside because the 
appellant never had the appeal guaranteed him, and is 
afforded for the first time a proper appeal, the law in effect 
when the abortive appeal was decided governs. In other 
words, we must treat the appeal as if a final judgment had 
been rendered before the date of Escobedo even though we 
know 110 such final judgment exists because the remittitur has 
been recalled! 
To accomplish this result the majority find it necessary to 
disapprove four recent cases. (People v. Jaquish, 244 Cal. 
App.2d 444 [53 Cal.Rptr. 123]; People v. Boyden, 237 Cal. 
App.2d 695 [47 Ca1.Rptr. 136J; People v. Garner, 234 
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Cal.App.2d 212 [44 Cal.Rptr. 217] ; People v. Benavidez, 233 
CaI.App.2d 303 [43 Cal.Rptr. 577].) In these four cases, this 
court, in denying hearings after decision by the Court of 
Appeal, had established the rule that where a remittitur was 
recalled and the second appeal was heard after Escobedo, 
Escobedo applied. 
In each of these four cases this court passed upon the 
precise legal point involved here, and then determined, for 
apparently convincing reasons, that Escobedo applied after 
the remittiturs were recalled. Such a well settled rule should 
not be disturbed except for the most compelling reasons. No 
convincing reasons are offered by the majority. 
The majority opinion is also contrary to the fundamental 
theory announced by this court in In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 
740 [48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P .2d 948]. That case held that the 
law in effect when the appeal is decided, even where the new 
rule is statutory, governs, and not the law when the act was 
committed or the case tried. The majority in the instant case 
by some undisclosed nunc pro tunc process apply the law in 
effect when the abortive appeal was considered. This is incon-
sistent and contrary to In re Estrada, supra. 
But of even greater importance the majority completely 
disregard, in fact do not even mention, the law applicable to 
the recall of a remittitur. It must be remembered that the 
remittitur was recalled here because appellant never had a 
valid appeal-he never had the appeal guaranteed to him, 
that is an appeal with counsel. The appeal without counsel 
was abortive and was set aside. The first' legal appeal that 
Rivers has had is the instant one. 
The very effect of recalling the remittitur is to set aside the 
"final" judgment. The so-called "final" judgment disap-
pears from the case, and the appeal is in the same position as 
if no appeal had been idecided. The theory is that when an 
appellate court recalls its remittitur it does not "resume" a 
jurisdiction it has lost, but, because of the facts requiring the 
recall, it has never lost jurisdiction-that the judgment 
recalled is a nullity and should be disregarded. (Isenberg v. 
Sherman, 214 Cal. 722, 725 [7 P.2d 1006]; Trumpler v. 
Trumpler, 123 Cal. 248, 252 [55 P. 1008].) These principles 
are disregarded in the majority opinion. 
There are other factors to be considered. Had Rivers had 
counsel on his first appeal it is conceivable counsel could have 
raised the very point later decided in Escobedo. The majority 
deny him that right. Moreover, had the appeal of Rivers been 
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delayed until after Escobedo was decided, he would, of course, 
have been entitled to the benefits of that decision under In re 
Lopez, supra, 62 Ca1.2d 368. These possibilities suggest a 
denial of equal protection in the instant case. 
Once it !s conceded that Rivers is entitled to raise the Esco-
bedo point, there can be no doubt that he was interrogated in 
violation of the rules of that case, and that such violation was 
prejudicial. At the very least, during his improper interroga-
tion he made damaging admissions. One statemeni amounted 
to a confession. This interrogation clearly violated the preju-
dicial error rule established by Fahy v. Connecticut, 378 U.S. 
85 [11 L.Ed.2d 171, 84 S.Ct. 229], and Chapman v. Cali-
fornia, 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824]. 
In Fahy v. Connecticut, supra, at page 86, the rule is stated 
to be that an error is prejudicial unless it can be said that 
there is· no "reasonable possibility that the evidence com-
plained of might have contributed to the conviction." In 
Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24, the Fahy case 
is specifically reaffirmed and the rule restated as "before a 
federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court 
must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. " 
Once· error is established, these rules require a reversal 
unlesn the appellate court affirmatively finds that there is no 
"reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might 
have contributed to the conviction." In the present case there 
is more than "reasonable possibility" that the error may 
have" contributed to the conviction." Certainly it cannot be 
said that "beyond a reasonable doubt" the error was harm-
less. That being so the error must be held prejudicial and 
therefore reversible. 
The fact that Rivers took the stand at his trial and repeated 
some but not all of the admissions did not immunize the error. 
Obviously, there is at least a "reasonable possibility" that he 
took the stand because he had already made the admissions 
which had been erroneously admitted. (People v. Spencer, 
lJ.nte, p. 158 [57 Cal.Rptr. 163, 424 P.2d 715].) 
I would reverse the judgment for the reasons stated. 
